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Abstract 
Purpose – This paper aims to explore human technology relations through the lens of sci-fi movies within the life 
cycle of the ETHICOMP conference series. Here, different perspectives on artificial intelligent agents, primarily in 
the shape of robots, but also including other kinds of intelligent systems, are explored. Hence, IT-ethical issues related to 
humans interactions with social robots and artificial intelligent agents are illustrated with reference to: Alex Proyas’ I, 
Robot; James Cameron’s Terminator; and the Wachowski brothers’ Matrix. All three movies present robots cast in the 
roles of moral agents capable of doing good or evil. Steven Spielberg’s Artificial Intelligence, A.I. gives rise to a 
discussion of the robot seen as a moral patient and furthermore reflects on possibilities for care and trust relations 
between robots and humans. Andrew Stanton’s Wall-E shapes a discussion of robots as altruistic machines in the role 
as facilitators of a flourishing society. Steven Spielberg’s Minority Report allows for a discussion of knowledge-
discovering technology and the possibility for balancing data utility and data privacy. 
Design/methodology/approach – Observations of themes in sci-fi movies within the life span of the ETHICOMP 
conference series are discussed with the purpose of illustrating ways in which science fiction reflects (science) 
faction. In that sense, science fiction does not express our worries for a distant future, but rather casts light over questions, 
which is of concern in the present time. 
Findings – Human technology interactions are addressed and it is shown how sci-fi films highlight philosophical 
questions that puzzle us today, such as which kind of relationships can and ought to be formed with robots, and whether 
the roles they play as social actors demand that one ought to assign moral standing to them. The paper does not present 
firm answers but instead pays attention to the selection and framing of questions that deserve attention. 
Originality/value – To relate sci-fi movies to topics raised during the past 20 years of the ETHICOMP conference 
series, seemed to be an appropriate way of celebrating the 20-year anniversary of the ETHICOMP conference series. 
Keywords Artificial intelligence, Philosophy, Surveillance, Autonomy, Trust, Artificial agents 
Paper type Research paper 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Terrell Ward Bynum and Simon Rogerson fostered the ETHICOMP conference back in 1995, and, 
over the years, they managed to cultivate an inspiring and open-minded community. They stepped 
down from the throne after ETHICOMP 2013, which took place in Kolding at University of 
Southern Denmark. In his closing remarks to this 
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conference, Terrell Ward Bynum noticed that (freely quoted by memory): “at the first ETHICOMP, 
back in 1995 there were around thirty delegates. By now, we are hundred humans and one robot”. 
Hereby, he pinpointed the impact of ETHICOMP, namely, the fact that the ETHICOMP 
community strives to explore and reflect pro-actively in responding to philosophical, social and 
moral questions raised by technology. 
In the same sense, it is well-known that art often captures emerging scientific advances or 
even, to some extent, functions as a source of enlightenment and inspiration to scientific discovery. But 
probably most of all, the expressive power of art provides us with ways of understanding ourselves 
and our being in the world. Here, particularly sci-fi movies stand out in their effort to grasp what 
is puzzling today seen through the lens of the future. Typically, the storylines in sci-fi movies 
reveal important philosophical questions regarding moral agency and patiency, consciousness, 
identity, social relations and privacy to mention just a few. In this paper, I shall be outlining an 
analysis of selected IT-ethical perspectives in sci-fi movies covering the timeline of the ETHICOMP 
conference series, which was launched in 1995 by the Centre for Computing and Social Responsibility 
(CCSR), Terrell Ward Bynum and Simon Rogerson. 
 
2. Technology as a social actor 
Traditionally, we have conceived machines as mere tools or extensions of human activity. But 
the development of relation-based technology, such as different types of artificial companions, 
implies a change in perspective to account for the role these technologies play as social actors: 
 
ACs [artificial companions] are a technological success because they are not the outcome of some 
unforeseeable breakthrough in strong AI, but the social equivalent of Deep Blue: they can deal well with 
their interactive tasks, even if they have the intelligence of an alarm clock. And they are 
philosophically significant precisely because they are neither Asimov’s robots nor Hal’s children. 
Out of the realm of thought experiments and unrestrained speculations, they posit concrete, 
philosophical questions. (Floridi, 2014, p. 153) 
 
Sci-fi movies also display philosophical and moral issues and highlight ways in which our formation 
of identity and self-understanding are influenced by robots, which have developed to become social 
actors. Likewise, within the field of human–robot interaction studies, several empirical studies 
illustrate ways in which we enter into relationships with social robots (Turkle, 2011; Dautenhahn, 
2007; Schärfe et al., 2011; Carpenter, 2013; Bartneck et al., 2007). For instance, when it comes to the 
case of inflicting pain on a robot, Bartneck et al.’s experiment, in which research subjects were asked 
to switch off a robot (which had assisted them during a test session), illustrates that research subjects 
were emotionally affected by the pleas of the robot and even entered into long dialogues with the robot 
before turning it off (Bartneck, 2007). 
Although, we are aware that robots are nothing but machines, the fact that we are highly 
meaning-seeking and interpretative beings causes us to anthropomorphize robots and intuitively 
interpret them as fellows, as illustrated by Schärfe et al. (2011), who refer that relations of trust 
can be observed in studying physical interaction between a person and a geminoid. Through 
empirical studies, they find evidence of initial trust formation, which springs from a hand 
placed on the shoulder of the geminoid, likewise eye contact with the geminoid also promotes 
intimacy. Similarly, at the ETHICOMP 2013 conference, Henrik Schärfe and his alter ego, Geminoid 
DK, were present as keynotes (www.geminoid.dk), and some among the female audience felt like 
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they were able to make eye contact with the geminoid. Consequently, as summarized in a phrase by 
Sherry Turkle, robots press our “Darwinian buttons” (Turkle, 2011, p. 8) and we respond with care even 
toward very simplistic robot design (Benford and Malartre, 2007, p. 165). Moreover, Turkle (2011, 
p. 49-ff.) warns us that the robotic moment is lurking in the horizon, which refers to the moment 
at which we prefer risk-free relationships with robots over challenging engagements with humans: 
 
As I have said, my story of this moment is not so much about advances in technology, 
impressive though these have been. Rather, I call attention to our strong response to the relatively 
little that sociable robots offer – fueled it would seem by our fond hope that they will offer more. With 
each new robot, there is a ramp-up in our expectations. I find us vulnerable – a vulnerability, I believe, 
not without risk. (Turkle, 2011, p. 52) 
 
On the other side, the World Robot Declaration was issued in 2004 in Japan, implying that maybe the 
time has come to discuss if there is a need for granting rights to robots? So far, we have dealt with 
whether we can assign responsibilities to artificial agents or not (Floridi and Sanders, 2004; Verbeek, 
2011). But, according to David Gunkel, we have not yet seriously started to consider whether we ought 
to have moral duties toward machines (Gunkel, 2012, p. 99). Hence, in The Machine Question – 
Critical Perspectives on AI, Robots, and Ethics (2012) – Gunkel argues that already by now, the term 
“person” has opened up to also include animals and corporations, and as we have started to grant rights to 
non-human agents, it might be a matter of time before we include machines into the category of persons 
(Gunkel, 2012, p. 39-ff.). If we do so, the question arises whether the kind of responsibilities we would 
have toward robots would be on par with the kind of responsibilities we have toward animals, 
corporations or other human beings? 
In a similar vein, sci-fi movies often highlight what is morally at stake in the relation, per se, rather 
than framing the plot around a distinction between personhood versus machine. The first 
mentioned perspective is illustrated in Artificial Intelligence, A.I. (Section 4), but, in what follows, 
we shall be paying attention to the second perspective, i.e. ways in which artificial moral agency 
constitute a threat to human autonomy. 
 
3. Robots as (in)moral agents 
The exploration of the impact of technology on civilization and especially the theme of loss of human 
control and autonomy due to robot interference, is a classic theme in sci-fi movies, as spelled out in A 
Space Odyssey, by Kubrick (1968), in which the intelligent computer H.A.L 9000 sets the mission of 
the spaceship above the crew. A similar theme is raised in the first Alien movie – here an android 
researcher risks the crew to preserve the alien for the sake of science. Within the timeline of ETHICOMP, 
the robot cast in the role as a moral agent with the ability to do (mostly) evil and good represents a 
strong narrative. 
This is shown in the movie I, Robot, by Alex Proyas (2004), which takes place in 2035 in a world in 
which social robots interact with humans as polite and caring servants. The overall storyline highlights 
challenges in the relationship between imperfect humans and perfect moral robots, which (or who?) 
by deduction from Asimov’s laws of robot ethics, turn against humanity in illustrating the 
paternalistic point that robots find it necessary to protect humans against themselves – with reference 
to Asimov’s zeroth law: “A robot may not harm humanity, or, by inaction, allow humanity to come to 
harm”. Fortunately, this logical inappropriate implication is short-circuited by the detective, Del 
Spooner. In this way, paternalism evaporates in favor of human autonomy, which 
  
includes our capabilities for imperfection and failures, thereby characterizing what makes us 
moral beings in the first place: 
 
There is nothing particularly ethical about adding up utilities or weighing pros and cons, until the 
decision maker feels the urge not to follow the ethical course of action it arrives at. 
(McDermott, 2008, p. 6) 
 
Next, and bearing the ETHICOMP timeline in mind, we shall be looking at Terminator 3 – the raise 
of the Machines, By James Cameron (2003). The plot develops around the latest version of a killing 
robot T-X, which is sent from the future by Skynet, a consciousness AI, whose main purpose is to get 
rid of humanity. The Terminator’s outstanding information processing abilities include infrared sight 
and context-sensitive action-guiding scripts. Moreover, the Terminator’s deliberations are not distracted by 
emotions but purely guided by rational calculations. These advantages enable it to always have a lead 
over humans. And, although we can never know what it is like to be a Terminator (Nagel, 1974), we are still 
allowed a first-person’s perspective on its sense impressions. Thus, we get an inside glimpse of the 
makeup of its perceptual apparatus and its mind. This camera technique gives rise to anxiety because 
it reveals a dedicated action minded species, which acts in accordance with efficient calculations 
without emotional distractions – as summarized by one of the leading actors: “It can’t be bargained 
with, it can’t be reasoned with, it doesn’t feel pity or remorse or fear, and it absolutely will not stop, ever, 
until you’re dead!” 
Hence, the Terminator travels back to our time to hunt down and kill Sarah Connor to bypass a future 
in which she gives birth to a son, John, who will grow up to become the future leader of a revolt against 
the machine rulers. In this particular movie, from 2003, Skynet also enters into cyber warfare and 
infects US army computer systems, thereby leaving the country open to attacks. As a minor curiosity 
in relation to the Terminator films, one might note that traces of our ambivalence toward humanoid 
machines are observable in the 100 heroes and Villains’ list of Hollywood films, on which 
Terminator was ranked the 22nd villain of all time, while the Terminator in Terminator 2: 
Judgment Day was ranked the 48th hero of all times. It has never happened before that the same 
character appears on these two opposing lists (Wikipedia: Terminator). 
Finally, in The Wachowski brothers’ Matrix movies, of which only the first, The Matrix 
(1999), is outstanding, we are introduced to a future-simulated reality named “the Matrix”, i.e. a 
computer-generated world run by machines to control humans and use their bodies as bio-electric 
raw material as sources for energy consumption. But a small group of hackers discover the virtual 
reality fraud. The rebellions grow supernatural powers and their knowledge of the true nature of the 
computer-simulated reality makes them capable of bending the natural laws. Hence, they try to 
overthrow the Matrix and win back human autonomy. 
Both films encapsulate an archetypical AI-narrative, which describes intelligence with 
reference to logic governed behavior: 
 
Some, at least, of what makes minds rational is their ability to perform computations on thoughts; when 
thoughts […] are assumed to be syntactically structured, and where “computation” means formal 
operations in the manner of Turing. (Fodor, 1998, p. 205) 
 
This narrative carries over to the present motivations for introducing lethal autonomous weapon 
systems (LARS) in warfare. Here, a main argument for assigning moral agency to LARS mainly rests 
upon the assumption that eventually, with the right kind of 
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implementation of a formal moral framework, such robots shall be able to outperform human beings 
and lead to more moral warfare (Arkin, 2007; Lin et al., 2008). Hence, moral robots are assumed to 
be better at moral decision-making and subsequently acting in accordance with rules of 
engagement under stressful conditions. Moreover, future combat robots presumably also hold 
promises of progressively more bloodless and less harmful warfare (Arkin, 2007, p. 6; Lin et al., 2008, 
p. 50-ff.), which implies that war might turn into a risk-free business – “When a robot dies, you don’t 
have to send a letter to its mother” (Singer, 2009, p. 31). But, this route down the future warfare lane 
seems to be paradoxically paved, as in line with Just War Theory (Walzer, 1977), war ought to be the 
last resort and not something that we turn to too easily, otherwise the global conflict level might 
increase dramatically. 
So far, our present discussion has concerned whether it is plausible to assign moral agency and 
responsibility to an AI agent, a discussion which is increasingly raised in philosophy (Floridi and 
Sanders, 2004; Sparrow, 2004, 2007; Verbeek, 2011) in tandem with the discussion of whether this 
implies that we ought to be responsible toward a robot, i.e. consider a robot as a proper receiver of 
moral considerations (Gunkel, 2012; Floridi, 2014; Benso, 2000). Consequently, in what follows, we 
shall be addressing issues of moral patiency in human–robot interactions. 
 
 
4. Robots as moral patient 
 
Should their [artificial companions] non-biological nature make us discriminate against them? The 
question casts an interesting light on our understanding of what kind of persons we would like to be. 
(Floridi, 2014, p. 154) 
 
Artificial Intelligence, AI., by Steven Spielberg (2001), tells the story of the first robot child, 
David, programmed to love and brought into an ordinary family, in which he functions as a 
substitute for a beloved son, who is in coma: 
 
Programmed to give and elicit love and affection, David is soon calling Monica “Mommy” and, bereft 
of her only natural child, she accepts and warms the artificial boy. (Clocksin, 2003, p. 1738) 
 
Later on, the son recovers and the robot is abandoned. David then sets out on a journey during which he 
undergoes a process of development. Throughout the film, David wishes to be real to be able to 
evoke his mother’s love, and the movie reflects upon issues of authenticity but at the same time also 
addresses what we become from entering into relationships with robots, which (whom) we choose to 
treat as inferior or slaves. 
This line of argument is reflected in Gunkel’s (2012) book The Machine Question, in which he 
establishes a framework for a thorough philosophical investigation of questions of whether 
machines are going to be held responsible to us for their actions and whether we are going to be 
responsible toward the machines’ rights. Gunkel emphasizes that a demand for robot rights may 
arise from their social interactivity (Gunkel, 2012). Consequently, while we may argue about the 
status of intelligence, people have already started to form relationships with artificial companions. 
The fact that they look like us, combined with their growing ability to behave as social actors, will 
cause new forms of friending and bonding in connection with human-robot interaction. If we 
treat these artifacts as mere machines without questioning whether robots ought to be worthy or 
deserving of ethical considerations, we risk facilitating a 
  
master–slave society. On this background, Gunkel advices us to (re)consider what kind of questions 
we ought to pay attention to in analyzing human–robot interaction. 
 
“When god-like Odysseus”, Leopold (1966, p. 237) recalls, “returned from the wars in Troy, he 
hanged all on one rope a dozen of slave-girls of his household whom he suspected of 
misbehavior during his absence. This hanging involved no question of propriety. The girls 
were property. The disposal of property was then, as now, a matter of expediency, not of right and 
wrong”. As long as others – whether human, animal, machine or otherwise – are defined as 
mere instruments or the property of a ruling group, they can justifiably be used, exploited and 
dispensed with in a way that is purely expedient and beyond any moral considerations whatsoever 
(Gunkel, 2012, p. 108). 
 
A contradicting viewpoint is reflected in revisiting Turkle’s earlier mentioned concept of 
the robotic moment (Turkle, 2011, p. 49-ff.), which reflects her worry that when we turn to 
robots we might gradually lose sight of that trust – as opposed to the kind of supposedly risk-free 
relationships we may enter into with robots – is essential for the formation of flourishing human 
relationships. Consequently, Turkle (2011, p. 6) argues for human superiority in claiming the 
existence of fundamental obstacles for forming trustful relationships with robots. According to 
Turkle, our interactions with robots are biased by our tendencies to anthropomorphize technology, 
which lacks any kind of authenticity and represents nothing more than a clever collection of 
“as if” performances. In this sense, it does not make sense to ascribe moral agency or patiency to 
robots: 
 
At the robotic moment, we have to be concerned that the simplification and reduction of relationship is 
no longer something we complain about. It may become what we expect, even desire. In this book I have 
referred to our vulnerabilities rather than our needs. Needs imply that we must have something. The idea of 
being vulnerable leaves a lot of room for choice. There is always room to be less vulnerable, more evolved. 
We are not stuck. To move forward together – as generations together – we are called upon to embrace the 
complexity of our situation. We have invented inspiring and enhancing technologies, and yet we have 
allowed them to diminish us. The prospect of loving, or being loved by, a machine changes what love can 
be. We know that the young are tempted. They have been brought up to be. Those who have known 
lifetimes of love can surely offer them more. When we are at our best, thinking about technology brings us 
back to questions about what really matters. (Turkle, 2011, p. 295) 
 
To elaborate on Turkle’s observations, it might be valuable to discuss the concept of trustful 
relations as contrary to “risk-free” relations. Hence, it is generally acknowledged that trust is vital for 
the flourishing of human life and a precondition of any cultural ordering (Løgstrup, 1997; Rawls, 
1999, p. 433); Fukuyama, 2003, p. 126). According to the moral philosophy of Løgstrup (1997), our 
fundamental human condition is rooted in the fact that life is interpersonal; we are mutually 
dependent on each other. Consequently, openness, in the sense of trusting, i.e. daring to risk 
ourselves in coming forward to meet the other, is a definitive feature of human co-existence and 
inherent in all communication. When we place trust in others, it involves genuine risk-taking, as we 
surrender ourselves to the other. Thus, the mutual dependence, from which the ethical in human life 
springs, can only be comprehended in understanding what is at stake in a given context between two 
given persons. 
The structure of all human encounters, or any kind of approaching, presupposes a fundamental 
trust that the other will meet your request and carries within it a risk that you will be met with 
rejection or carelessness. Hence, we are obliged to act out of 
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consideration to the best of the other. Løgstrup is not addressing the kind of universality we find in Kant’s 
(1785, p. A54) categorical imperative, rather Løgstrup points to that we find ourselves situated in a given 
context with an particular person in a specific situation – what is ethically important is, so to speak, 
consideration for the other in an abstract, which allows us to put our moral dispositions to test (Fink, 
2005, p. 99). But, in entering into relationships with robots, we are not faced with having to surrender 
ourselves to the social robot. Even though the robot acts in a human-like way and displays emotions, 
there is nothing at stake besides “as-if” behavior caused by programmed internal states and executed so 
as to ensure adequate adaption to the surroundings. We know that this is the case about our relationship – 
the robot simulates, and we invest without cost. 
By now, we have two strong lines of arguments regarding what interacting with social robots 
might mean and do to us. On the one side, Turkle worries that we will lose something important to our 
humanity and discover it too late – as the title of her book indicates: “Alone together – why we expect 
more from technology and less from each other” (Turkle, 2011). On the other side, Gunkel 
emphasizes that we ought to start to think about rights beyond living things, i.e. give moral standing 
to robots to frame possible ways in which we perceive of and respond to robots. Hence, it does not 
matter whether Paro, the seal, is “authentic”, what matters is the fact that we will be affected by its social 
interactivity; grandfather will get emotionally attached to Paro and it will become an important part 
of his life. From this perspective, it seems inhumane to treat Paro with cruelty and, for instance, tear 
out its batteries in front of grandfather. A demand for moral rights may arise precisely from such 
social relationships. 
In summarizing, Artificial Intelligence, A.I. encapsulates both perspectives; on the one hand, the 
robot boy, David, is obviously non-authentic, without emotions and even to some extend not able to 
imitate appropriate responses toward the surroundings (in one scene, he laughs loudly without sense of 
situational awareness). In this manner, the film expresses that there might be something morally 
disturbing about the whole idea of the kind of non-authentic substitute relationship the robot boy offers. 
On this background, we should go with Turkle and her concerns for “as if” relationships. But despite 
this, we feel sorry for David and find him worthy or deserving of ethical considerations when kids 
are bullying David and when his mother leaves him behind in a forest – once her real son has 
recovered and the conflict level between him and David is building up. 
Both Gunkel and Turkle address what kind of persons we would like to be, but they stay in separate 
camps: in conclusion, one could say that Turkle emphasizes that personhood is what links moral 
agency to responsibility and moral patiency to a claim for rights. Gunkel uses the social 
relationships we enter into with robots as a springboard for asking what happens when robots 
grow into our lives and if our attachment to social robots implies that we ought to assign moral 
standing to machines? Artificial Intelligence, A.I., manages to show us both perspectives. 
 
5. Altruistic robots 
As a research field, AI, was coined at the Dartmouth Conference in 1956 and Turing wrote his 
famous article Computing Machinery and Intelligence six years earlier (Turing, 1950), since the 
fifties, the classical mind– body problem has been reframed to account for the possibility or 
unfeasibility of robot and machine consciousness (Wisdom et al., 1952; Scriven, 1953; Mackay, 
1956; Ziff, 1959; Lacey, 1960; Culbertson, 1963; Putnam, 
1964). 
  
 
 
More recently, implementation of bottom-up learning is reflected in Rodney Brooks’s (1991, p. 
139) ideas about the emergence of intelligence as cognition without representation – “with 
strict reliance on interfacing to the real world through perception and action, reliance on representation 
disappears”. By an incremental approach toward AI, Brooks seeks to avoid the frame problem 
(McCarty and Hayes, 1969; Dennett, 1988; Ford, 1996) and sets out to create artificial low-level 
perceptual and sense-motoric routines, which, put together, might eventually evolve into a 
significant level of intelligence. It sounds rather optimistic that conceptual complex mental 
activities, like daydreams, planning or deliberative judgment can be broken down into modules of such 
reflex mechanisms. But, according to a physicalist perspective toward AI, it could be argued that 
some kind of robot evolution is realizable and will bring about robots with minds of their own. 
Presumably, based on some initial framework serving as a parent adviser, such robots shall be capable 
of self-learning and adaption to new environments. 
This gives rise to ideas about implementing a virtue ethical framework for growing artificial 
moral maturity: 
 
In robotics, so-called “friendliness theory” attempts to deal with this conundrum: rather than using any finite 
set of top-down rules or laws, intelligent machines should be programmed to be basically altruistic, and then 
use machine learning in various settings to create a kind of “best judgment” in how to carry out properly 
altruistic actions. This approach sidesteps the fundamental calculation and programming problem of how 
to account for a vast number of unforeseeable eventualities. (Lin et al., 2008, p. 39) 
 
To phrase moral maturity in the MacIntyrian way, as persons, we acquire virtues in our developmental 
path from dependent to independent reasoners. As such, we become independent practical 
reasoners through life experience and through the learning (including rule following behaviour) 
we get from care persons during our childhood. Consequently, we grow to become moral mature 
persons capable of expressing and enacting our values in a social context (MacIntyre, 1999, pp. 158-
159). If we should ever happen to succeed in creating virtuous machines, we will have to 
deal with a consciousness robot with free will, intentions, goals, self-interest, that is, a moral agent 
with a justified claim for rights. If robots have this status, we are committed to treat them as moral 
beings in their own right even though they might turn out to develop a moral sense beyond our 
understanding. 
From a family-friendly angle, an altruistic robot is presented in Wall-E, by Stanton (2008). 
Together with a cockroach, the garbage collecting robot Wall-E is left behind on a polluted earth, from 
which humans have escaped in big space shuttles. While waiting for everything to get better on the 
earth, which humans seem to assume will happen all by itself (almost like nowadays attitude toward 
issues of global warming), they spend their days engaging in superficial activities, quiet similar 
to a satirical version of American cruise tourists. Hence, they eat (too much), they sit (too much), 
i.e. they are driven around in flying “arm chairs” with futuristic Ipad-like devices placed right in 
front of their heads allowing them to take in (too much and too silly) information, which also suggests 
that interpersonal encounters are spare. Furthermore, due to severe obesity and physical 
inactivity, they are only able to crawl. Moreover, we can easily imagine that this life style is 
not doing anything good for the power of sexual reproduction and that this might endanger 
the survival of the human species. The seamless integration of humans and technological artifacts 
has turned out not to be of any benefit to humanity, rather humans have become like grown-up 
helpless babies. 
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 Here, Wall-E tells the story of a future world in which love between two robots, Wall-E and Eva (a 
scout robot, which is sent back to earth from the space shuttle to explore, whether it is possible for 
humans to return to the earth), becomes a unique catalyst for reestablishing a once lost flourishing 
human world. The message is that altruistic robots may succeed in saving us from ourselves, in the feel-
good sense of the term, i.e. not by trying to take over and deprive us of our autonomy, like expressed 
above in I, Robot. 
 
 
6. Surveillance 
So far, the article has dealt with AI agents in the shape of social robots, but other sci-fi themes are of 
course also worth mentioning, such as the surveillance theme reflected in the movie Nineteen Eighty-
Four, by Michael Radford (1984), which is based on the dystopian novel by George Orwell, and 
describes a totalitarian society with no room for freedom and no ability for building trustful 
relationships. 
Stressing our context of the ETHICOMP conference series’ timeline, we shall be looking closer 
into a more recent version of the surveillance theme. Hence, in Minority report, by Steven Spielberg 
(2002), crime is eliminated from Washington due to the use of advanced knowledge-discovery technology 
in the shape of three pre-cogs, which operate by means of a kind of distributed cognition allowing them to 
look into the future and come up with precise crime predictions. Hence, in 2054, law enforcement 
agencies have the capabilities to respond to criminal activities even before they actually take place, 
and Minority report highlights what is at stake in cases in which knowledge-discovery 
technologies may infringe upon individuals and groups control of how information relating to them, their 
actions and their relations are represented. 
As an example of a knowledge-discovering technology, the currently ongoing EU project 
ePOOLICE (www.epoolice.eu) aims at developing an efficient and effective environmental 
scanning system as part of the early warning system for the detection of emerging organized crime 
threats and changes in modus operandi. The purpose is to be able to meet the future challenges of 
fighting organized crime by ensuring that law enforcement are capable of engaging in proactive 
planning at the strategic level. 
For the moment being, the current situation and priorities in fighting organized crime can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
The SOCTA, 2013 [EU Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment] identifies a number of key priorities, 
which, in Europol’s view, require the greatest concerted action by EU Member States and other actors to ensure 
the most effective impact on the general threat. Facilitated illegal immigration, trafficking in human beings, 
synthetic drugs and poly-drug trafficking, Missing Trader Intra-Community (MTIC) fraud, the 
production and distribution of counterfeited goods, cybercrime and money laundering are the particular 
crime areas listed in this category. (SOCTA, 2013, foreword by Director of Europol, Rob Wainwright) 
 
But it is also important to be able to pay attention to possible future crime scenarios, which may be 
lurking in the horizon. Hence, in the ePOOLICE system, environmental scanning is carried out on data 
streams from a variety of online public sources, focusing on modus operandi and crime trends, not on 
individuals. Different kinds of public online data streams feed into the system’s knowledge repository 
that provides a rich taxonomy of domain knowledge. Moreover, data processing is facilitated by means 
of information fusion techniques, enabling the extraction of descriptive and predicative meanings used 
for inferring hidden states, i.e. weak signals or indicators of organized crime activities. 
  
 
 
In general, such environmental scanning systems for early warning operate at the strategic level 
of open source intelligence and do not aim at identifying individuals. Nevertheless, ethical and 
technical issues related to potential privacy infringements in public online contexts still have to be 
addressed to establish a privacy preserving framework, which ascribes privacy protection into 
the given system design (Gerdes et al., 2013; Gerdes, 2014). 
In relation to the development of environmental scanning systems for early warning, it is crucial to 
balance security at a societal level with citizens’ right to privacy – in short, to balance data privacy and 
data utility, which is by no means a trivial task. Still, and in line with the ETHICOMP spirit, it can be 
done by engaging in “engineering activism” (a term coined by Nissenbaum, 2001), which implies that 
to deal with the ethical impact of systems in context, one must take a pro-active stance toward the 
challenge of bringing ethics to design: 
 
Humanists and social scientists can no longer bracket technical details – leaving them to someone else – 
as they focus on the social effects of technology. Fastidious attention to the before-and-after picture, 
however richly painted, is not enough. Sometimes a fine-grained understanding of systems – even down 
to gritty details of architecture, algorithm, code, and possibly the underlying physical characteristics - 
plays an essential part in describing and explaining the social, ethical, and political dimensions of new 
information technologies. (Nissenbaum, 2001) 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
Sci-fi movies are not about predicting the future, rather they reflect the issues worth asking in our 
present time. On this background, this article casts light upon the broad spectrum of moral 
questions that may arise from human technology interactions, particularly focusing on themes 
addressed in sci-fi movies within the ETHICOMP conference series’ timeline. 
Hence, sci-fi movies conceptualize philosophical questions in illustrating what assigning 
agency or patiency to artificial agents means for our being in the world. In conclusion, sci-fi 
movies encapsulate how we are shaped through the kind of relationships we enter into with 
robots. Moreover, AI agents can also be embedded in intelligent systems, as illustrated in Minority 
Report, which gives rise to address issues of intelligent surveillance technologies. Here, concerns 
related to the increasingly pressure upon privacy, due to the introduction of advanced 
knowledge-discovery technologies, are illustrated and the article argues that, as IT-ethicists, we 
should not only take an applied approach to ethics, i.e. engage in after-the-fact critical analyses. 
Rather, whenever possible we ought to act proactively and “do ethics” by getting involved in 
the developmental phases of designing technology. 
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